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RECENT DECISIONS
Torts: Products Liability: Strict Liability-In Netzel v. State Sand
and Gravel Co.,' the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated its position
on the emerging theory of strict liability as it applies to allegedly
defective products. Plaintiff sustained ankle burns while working
as a "puddler" when concrete fell inside his shoes and lodged
against his legs. He brought an action based upon strict liability
against the concrete supplier, contending that the concrete was
contaminated with a caustic additive. The jury returned a verdict
finding the defendant 100 per cent negligent. As to the jury finding
that the concrete was defective and unreasonably dangerous, the
defendant, on appeal, contended that the only expert testimony
offered contradicted such findings and, since no expert witness was
produced by the plaintiff, there was no basis for finding either a
defect or an unreasonable danger.
Although judgment was reversed and the cause remanded for
a new trial on the issue of contributory negligence, the court held
that the unexplained event, when combined with evidence rebutting
the existence of other probable causes, is sufficient to warrant a
jury finding of a defect in the concrete making it unreasonably
dangerous.
Previous to the Netzel decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
adopted, in Dippel v. Sciano,2 the rule of strict liability in tort for
defective products as set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts
section 402A.3 What this means in Wisconsin, with its doctrine of
comparative negligence, "is that a seller who meets the conditions
of see. 402A . . .is guilty of negligence as a matter of law."4 The
liability to be imposed under the rule of strict liability, while not
grounded upon a failure to exercise ordinary care with its element
1. 51 Wis. 2d 1, 186 N.W.2d 258 (1971).
2. 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) reads as follows:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to
the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
4. 37 Wis. 2d at 464, 155 N.W.2d at 66 (concurring opinion).
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of foreseeability, is virtually the same as negligence per se.5
To be found negligent per se under this doctrine, the plaintiff
must prove:
(1) that the product was in defective condition when it left the
possession or control of the seller, (2) that it was unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer, (3) that the defect was a cause
(a substantial factor) of the plaintiff's injuries or damages, (4)
that the seller engaged in the business of selling such product or,
put negatively, that this is not an isolated or infrequent transac-
tion not related to the principal business of the seller, and (5) that
the product was one which the seller expected to and did reach
the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition
it was when he sold it.6
Therefore, while strict liability obviates the necessity of establish-
ing foreseeability of harm as a requisite for a finding of negligence,
the plaintiff is not relieved from the burden of showing a defect in
the product. Thus, the manufjcturer's strict liability depends on
what is meant by "defective. ' 7
The court, in Dippel, expressly refrained from adopting or re-
jecting any of the definitive comments which supplement section
402A,5 and did not otherwise define "defective condition" or "un-
reasonably dangerous" which appear in elements (1) and (2) above,
not having been faced with those questions. But the court in Netzel
was directly faced with the question of the measure of proof re-
quired to establish the presence of a defect, the answer to which
requires adoption of appropriate definitions for "defective" and
"unreasonably dangerous."
The trial court in Netzel defined "defective condition" and
"unreasonably dangerous" in its instructions:
5. Negligence per se was defined in Osborne v. Montgomery, 203 Wis. 223, 240, 234
N.W.2d 372, 378 (1931) as follows:
We now come to a consideration of that class of cases where foreseeability is not an
element of negligence-a more accurate statement would be to that class of cases
where the defendant is foreclosed or concluded upon the question of foreseeability.
In all those cases where it is said that the performance of the wrongful act being
admitted the defendant is guilty of negligence as a matter of law or that the act is
negligent per se, the case is one which admits of no question as to reasonable
anticipation or foreseeability.
6. 37 Wis. 2d at 460, 155 N.W.2d at 63.
7. For a complete discussion of what constitutes a defect in a product, see Traynor, The
Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363
(1965).
8. 37 Wis. 2d at 459, 155 N.W.2d at 63.
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'By defective condition is meant a condition not expected by
the purchaser, which then renders the product unreasonably dan-
gerous for its intended or foreseeable use.
'To be unreasonably dangerous, the product must be danger-
ous to an extent beyond that which would be expected by the
ordinary user with the ordinary knowledge common to the com-
munity as to its characteristics.' 9
The supreme court's express approval of these instructions, ° which
in essence frame "defect" and "unreasonably dangerous" in terms
of deviation from the norm," clarifies to some extent the present
state of products liability law in Wisconsin.
But these definitions, when applied to a certain class of prod-
ucts, become over-inclusive. To circumvent this, the Restatement
would impose no strict liability for what are classified as "unavoid-
ably unsafe products.' 2 These products are characterized as those
"which, in the present state of human knowledge, are quite incapa-
ble of being made safe for their intended and ordinary use.' 3 The
Restatement stipulates that "[s]uch a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is not defec-
9. 51 Wis. 2d at 11, 186 N.W.2d at 263.
10. Id. at 11, 186 N.W.2d at 264.
11. Approval of these instructions is, in effect, an adoption of two comments to
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). Comment g at 351, Defective condition,
reads, in part, as follows:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves
the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which
will be unreasonably dangerous to him ...
Comment i at 352, Unreasonably dangerous, reads, in part, as follows:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective condition of the
product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. . . .The article
sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by
the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to
the community as to its characteristics ...
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment k at 353 (1965) reads in part
as follows:
Unavoidably unsafe products. There are some products which, in the present state
of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe for their intended and
ordinary use. These are especially common in the field of drugs . . . .Such a
product, properly prepared, and accompanied by proper directions and warning, is
not defective, nor is it unreasonably dangerous . . . .The seller of such products,
again with the qualification that they are properly prepared and marketed, and
proper warning is given, where the situation calls for it, is not to be held to strict
liability for unfortunate consequences attending their use, merely because he has
undertaken to supply the public with an apparently useful and desirable product,
attended with a known but apparently reasonable risk.
13. Id.
1972]
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tive, nor is it unreasonably dangerous."14
Prosser, in discussing the types of products to be included
within the doctrine of strict liability, also recognizes the existence
of unavoidably dangerous products:
There are quite a few cases involving a product such as cement,
useful and reasonably harmless for proper purposes, but capable
of causing serious harm when the user kneels in it and burns his
skin; and in all of them it has been held that there is no liability
whether for negligence or for breach of warranty. 5
The defendant in Netzel contended that the trial court should
have held its product to be unavoidably unsafe, with a correspond-
ing instruction that "cement cannot be made without the presence
of lime as a principal ingredient."' 6 The Wisconsin Supreme Court,
without elaboration, rejected this contention on the basis that both
plaintiff and defendant had introduced evidence "that ordinary
concrete was not unavoidably dangerous, at least not to the degree
of causing second or third degree burns."' 7
This reasoning apparently assumes that the effects of the use
of a given product are consistent in all situations-if the product
has been used at least once without causing harm, then it is not
unavoidably unsafe. But the unavoidably unsafe products with
which the Restatement deals are not characterized by their inevita-
ble causation of harm, but rather by the "unavoidable high degree
of risk which they involve."'" This appears to be the degree of risk
which the court recognized when, in dealing with the issue of con-
tributory negligence later in the opinion, it stated that "concrete,
even ordinary concrete, can inflict burns."' 9
Courts in various jurisdictions, when considering cement burn
cases, have consistently held that the plaintiff had failed to estab-
14. Id. As to the necessity for warning, commentj at 353 states that
a seller is not required to warn with respect to products, or ingredients in them, which
are only dangerous, or potentially so, when consumed in excessive quantity, or over
a long period of time, when the danger, or potentiality of danger, is generally known
and recognized. ...
This comment also would be applicable, since the plaintiff in Netzel testified "that he knew
that cement containing lime has a burn potential and, if left in contact with the skin for a
prolonged period of time, will cause burns." 51 Wis. 2d at 13, 186 N.W.2d at 265.
15. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L.
REV. 791, 810 (1966).
16. 51 Wis. 2d at 11, 186 N.W.2d at 264.
17. Id.
18. Note 12 supra.
19. 51 Wis. 2d at 13, 186 N.W.2d at 265.
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lish a jury case by proving that he was burned upon contact with
concrete. In Dalton v. Pioneer Sand & Gravel Co., 0 plaintiff
sought damages based upon a breach of warranty for burns re-
ceived from handling cement. In affirming a judgment of dismissal,
the court noted that the plaintiff, despite having been burned, had
failed to show that the cement contained any unusual substance or
differed in any way from ordinary cement. 21
The court in Netzel held, on the theory of strict liability, that
"the unexplained event when combined with evidence rebutting the
existence of other probable causes is sufficient to warrant a jury
finding of a defect in the concrete that was unreasonably danger-
ous." 2  Should this measure of proof be applied to a product which
is unavoidably unsafe? If so, the practical effect is to impose abso-
lute liability on manufacturers of these products. This was not the
intent of the Wisconsin Supreme Court when it adopted the theory
of strict liability:
Strict liability does not make the manufacturer or seller an in-
surer nor does it impose absolute liability. From the plaintiffs
point of view the most beneficial aspect of the rule is that it
relieves him of proving specific acts of negligence and protects
him from the defenses of notice of breach, disclaimer, and lack
of privity in the implied warranty concepts of sales and con-
tracts.23
The Netzel measure of proof, predicated upon an "unexplained
event," appears to be analogous to one of the elements in the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine, which requires an injury which does not
ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence.24 But a product which
is unavoidably unsafe can, by definition, cause injuries in the ab-
sence of both negligence and defect. Application of this measure
of proof to such a product has the effect of shifting the burden of
proof to the defendant, requiring him to show the absence of a
defect. 25
20. 37 Wash. 2d 946, 227 P.2d 173 (1951).
21. Simmons v. Rhodes & Jamieson, Ltd., 46 Cal. 2d 190, 293 P.2d 26 (1956); Katz v.
Arundel-Brooks Concrete Corp., 220 Md. 200, 151 A.2d 731 (1959); Baker v. Stewart Sand
& Material Co., 353 S.W.2d 108 (Mo. App. 1961); Imperial v. Central Concrete, Inc., 1
App. Div. 2d 671, 146 N.Y.S.2d 307, affd, 2 N.Y.2d 939, 142 N.E.2d 209, 162 N.Y.S.2d
35 (1957).
22. 51 Wis. 2d at 8, 186 N.W.2d at 262.
23. 37 Wis. 2d at 459-60, 155 N.W.2d at 63.
24. Turk v. H.C. Prange Co., 18 Wis. 2d 547, 119 N.W.2d 365 (1963).
25. For discussion of the inapplicability of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in proving the
existence of a defect in a product under the strict liability theory, see Freedman, "Defect"
19721
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Can the court's measure of proof, assuming arguendo its appl-
icability to an unavoidably unsafe product, be satisfied without
reference to expert testimony? The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
held that "expert testimony should be adduced concerning matters
involving special knowledge or skill or experience on subjects
which are not within the realm of the ordinary experience of man-
kind, and which require special learning, study, or experience." 6
Differentiating between a dangerous defect and a dangerous char-
acteristic intrinsic to the product would seem to be such a matter.
How then do we determine when a defect exists that is unrea-
sonably dangerous, so as to attribute injuries to the manufacturer?
While inferential evidence of a defect by negating other probable
causes may be appropriate in many products liability cases, proof
of defect in an unavoidably unsafe product would seem to require
either direct evidence of an expert, or circumstantial evidence
through use of expert opinion, of the specific defect.
These and other proof problems, however, cannot be satisfacto-
rily resolved in a products liability case until the meanings of
"defective" and "unreasonably dangerous" are clarified. Adoption
of comment k to section 402A17 would accomplish this in the area
of unavoidably unsafe products and would facilitate a more just
and accurate delineation of the scope of a manufacturer's liability.
JOHN E. VALEN
Torts: The Constitutional Validity of Parental Liability
Statutes-In 1956, the Georgia Legislature passed a law which
stated that parents would be liable for the "willful and wanton acts
of vandalism" of minor children under their custody and control.'
In a series of cases interpreting that provision, the Supreme Court
of Georgia found that, because of the use of the word "vandalism",
the enactment was intended to apply only to acts directed against
property, or to personal injury incidental to acts directed against
property.2 In obvious response to the court's holdings, the legisla-
in the Product: The Necessary Basis for Products Liability in Tort and in Warranty, 33
TENN. L. REv. 323 (1966).
26. Cramer v. Theda Clark Memorial Hospital, 45 Wis. 2d 147, 150, 172 N.W.2d 427,
428-29 (1969).
27. Note 12 supra.
I. Law of March 9, 1956, no. 421, [1956] Ga. Laws 699 (repealed 1966).
2. Vort v. Westbrook, 221 Ga. 39, 142 S.E.2d 813 (1965); Bell v. Adams, I ll Ga. App.
819, 143 S.E.2d 413 (1965); Landers v. Medford, 108 Ga. App. 525, 133 S.E.2d 403 (1963).
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